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I LEGAL RESEARCH
Of PDRs and Precedent
By Jim Paulsen and James Hambleton
Pity the poor Texas Court ofCriminal Appeals! Here it is,the court's one-hundredth birth-day, and nobody seems to becelebrating. A blue-ribbon
commission recommends that the supreme
court take direct administrative control of
the court of criminal appeals, and some
propose to get rid of the court altogether.
Even make things worse, the state legisla-
ture has just eliminated almost all of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' jurisdic-
tion by repealing all crimes but murder,
effective Sept. 1, 1994. (Yes, they really
did - just check West's 1992 pocket part
for Title I of the Penal Code. And no, they
really didn't mean it ... at least, we hope
they didn't. And yes, there's a story behind
it, but the story is too long and too boring
even for this column.)
Adding insult to injury, people won't
even leave the court's birthday celebration
alone. No less a legal authority than the
Texas Lawyer, in its Sept. 14, 1992 edition,
announced that the court of criminal
appeals dates to 1876, which would make
the centenary celebration about 25 years
too late. The Texas Lawyer evidently
agrees with the Harvard Bluebook, which
has always insisted on confusing the "old"
court of appeals with the court of criminal
appeals. This sort of mistake evidently is
easier to make than one might think:
LEXIS lists occasional court of criminal
appeals rulings as court of appeals deci-
sions, and vice versa. Even U.T.'s
Greenbook can't get it right. Up through
the sixth edition, the Texas Rules of Form
claimed the court of criminal appeals dated
to 1889. The newest (eighth) edition,
issued in September, now swears that the
court dates to 1891, which would put the
birthday celebration off by a year.
Our best guess, though admittedly con-
trary to the combined and weighty authori-
ty of the Bluebook, Greenbook, and Texas
Lawyer, is that 1992 really does mark the
centenary of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals. The enabling legislation did not
"Our best guess..., is
that 1992 really does mark
the centenary of the Texas
Court of Criminal
Appeals. The enabling
legislation did not take
effect until Sept. 1, 1892
and the first reported
decision is dated Oct. 9,
1892."
take effect until Sept. 1, 1892 and the first
reported decision - Jim Jones v. State -
is dated Oct. 9, 1892. (Mr. Jones, by the
way, was convicted of murder in the
course of attempted horsetheft and sen-
tenced to life in prison; so far as the court
of criminal appeals is concerned, he may
still be there.)
So, if this really is the court's hundredth
birthday, what sort of contribution can a
legal research column make to the celebra-
tion? The answer is easy. We propose to
take the next couple of pages to demon-
strate that the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals is badly underrated in at least one
respect - its use of discretionary review
powers to discourage out-of-staters from
even thinking about setting up a law prac-
tice in Texas.
The U.S. Supreme Court took more than
50 years to complicate the certiorari
process to the point that even specialists
cannot understand it. Likewise, the Texas
Legislature and Texas Supreme Court
played with the writ of error system for
nearly a century before refining it to the
point that it now generates hate mail from
the Fifth Circuit. (Check out, for example,
Exxon Co. v. Banque de Paris, 889 F.2d
674 (5th Cir. 1989)). Yet the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, in but a few short
years, has put the petition for discretionary
review (or "PDR" to insiders) process on a
track that bids fair to eclipse both of its
illustrious counterparts.
A decade or so ago, when the PDR sys-
tem went into effect, no one could have
suspected such an outcome - after all, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was
given so very little with which to work. In
1981, when the legislature decided that
criminal appeals should first be routed to
the various courts of appeals instead of
being sent directly to Austin, the court of
criminal appeals was given discretionary
jurisdiction. The original recommendation
from the Judicial Planning Committee was
that the process should be called "writ of
certiorari," just like that of the U.S.
Supreme Court. After vigorous debate, dur-
ing which the merits of the Texas Supreme
Court's writ of error notation system were
considered repeatedly and specifically
rejected, the certiorari approach was adopt-
ed.
The only change, and a good one at that,
was to replace the plain English phrase
"petition for discretionary review" for the
unspellable and unpronounceable "writ of
certiorari." That way, not only could ordi-
nary humans understand what was going
on without resorting to a dictionary, but the
court of criminal appeals could ignore
some of the more questionable aspects of
the U.S. Supreme Court's certiorari prac-
tice - like dissents or concurrences on
certiorari.
At first, it looked like the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals was determined to keep
things simple. In a 1983 decision, the court
went to great pains to announce that a
"PDR refused" is not "an endorsement or
adoption of the reasoning employed by the
court of appeals." So far, so good. That's
what "discretionary" is all about. But then,
only a few months later, the court issued its
opinion in Sheffield v. State (650 S.W.2d
813).
In Sheffield, the court of criminal
appeals refused the petition for discre-
tionary review per curiam. The court stat-
ed, in what has since become a litany in
many PDR refusals: "As is true in every
case, refusal of discretionary review by
this court does not constitute an endorse-
ment or adoption of the reasoning
employed by the court of appeals."
The court just would not leave it at that,
though. Instead, it continued, in language
quoted many times since:
To prevent any misunderstanding, we
take this opportunity to emphasize that
the summary refusal of a petition for
discretionary review by this Court is of
no precedential value. This is true
where the petition is refused without
opinion, as is the usual practice, as well
as where the petition is refused with a
brief opinion disavowing the reasoning
employed by the court of appeals, as in
the instant case. The Bench and Bar of
the State should not assume that the
summary refusal of a petition for dis-
cretionary review lends any additional
authority to the opinion of the court of
appeals.
And the interpretation race was on!
The basic problem with the Sheffield
rule, of course, is that it is intuitively unbe-
lievable. Think about it for a second: The
refusal of a PDR is never of any preceden-
tial value even if some petitions are
refused "with a brief opinion disavowing
the reasoning employed by the court of
appeals"? Sure. A more natural conclusion
would be that if the court of criminal
appeals says something when it doesn't
agree with the lower court's reasoning, we
can assume the court is not offended by
those decisions in which it refuses a PDR
without comment. And that is exactly what
a lot of people, including some courts,
have concluded.
To improve the scholarly tone of this
column a little, we should note that, since
Sheffield, it has become clear that there are
at least four types of PDR "refusals." Type
I, or plain vanilla refusals, consist of a sim-
ple statement from the court that the peti-
tion for discretionary review has been
refused. Type II, or double-dip vanilla
refusals, consist of a notation from the
court that the petition for discretionary
review has been refused, together with an
additional statement (usually citing
Sheffield) to the effect that the refusal real-
ly, absolutely, positively doesn't mean any-
thing at all. Type III, or chocolate-flavored
refusals, include some dark hints - as in
Sheffield - to the effect that the court of
criminal appeals is displeased with some-
thing the lower court did.
The Type IV PDR refusal, a rare butter-
scotch-flavored variety, turns the court of
appeals' opinion golden, as in the court of
criminal appeals' conclusion in Gersh v.
State that "we have reviewed the record
and agree with the court of appeals opin-
ion. We believe that they reached the cor-
rect result for the correct reasons in decid-
ing this issue." As if this were not
complicated enough, individual members
of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
also have taken to dribbling marshmallow
or chocolate topping on some PDR
refusals, in the form of concurrences or
dissents, or even just topping off a PDR
refusal with a little red cherry "so-and-so
would grant" notation. Our listing is not
exclusive, by the way. Other varieties of
PDR refusal could include chocolate-vanil-
la swirl and mocha with sprinkles. But we
have already gone into more than enough
detail for one column.
The result of this wonderfully intricate
system is predictable: a free-for-all in the
lower courts. We can find statements like
the Amarillo Court of Appeals' conclusion
that by refusing a PDR outright (plain
vanilla) the court of criminal appeals
"approved [the] result," and San Antonio's
conclusion that the PDR "constitutes the
only recent indication of the court's feel-
ings," juxtaposed with Eastland's conclu-
sion that "refusal of a petition for discre-
tionary review adds nothing to the
precedential value of an opinion." The cur-
rent majority opinion, to the extent that
any majority can be discerned from this
mess, seems to be - in the words of a
respected law professor/judge writing in
one of our state's law reviews - that
refusal at least "indicates a finding that the
court of appeals reached the correct
result." No matter how you slice it, of
course, that conclusion makes PDR denials
at least a little bit precedential, and is sure-
ly contrary to Sheffield.
The impact of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals' PDR practice is not
limited simply to speculation over the
extent to which a "PDR refused" adds to or
detracts from the value of a court of
appeals opinion. After all, every time any-
one on the court of criminal appeals writes
anything in the course of a PDR refusal,
that becomes an "opinion," printed in
West's reporters. Little wonder that, when-
ever authority lies thin on the ground, the
temptation to quote or cite these statements
becomes irresistible. In highbrow legal
theory, of course, if refusing a PDR means
nothing, anything the court of criminal
appeals says in refusing a PDR is dicta,
and dissents or concurrences on denials
should be double dicta, at least.
Nonetheless, courts cite "PDR refused" per
curiams left and right.
At first blush, one might think that this
is exactly the sort of behavior that the
court of criminal appeals was warning
against in Sheffield - intense scrutiny of
every word the court might utter, thereby
changing an inherently non-precedential
act into something at least a little bit prece-
dential. The court warned in Sheffield that
no aspect of a PDR refusal - including
the opinion on PDR refusal - is preceden-
tial and at least a dozen subsequent PDR
refusals repeat the message.
The problem, though, is that the court of
criminal appeals has gotten itself caught in
a classic form of "Do as I say, not as I do"
reasoning. Every time the court of criminal
appeals writes a PDR denial emphasizing
that PDR denials mean nothing it cites as
authority - you guessed it - Sheffield,
nothing more than a PDR denial itself.
Little wonder that the lower courts now
cite and discuss, whenever the spirit moves
them, per buriam PDR refusals (Amarillo,
Dallas, and San Antonio, at least), or even
concurrences (Eastland and Houston
[14th]) or dissents on PDR refusal (Dallas
and Waco). This habit is not necessarily
bad - after all, some four-judge concur-
rences on PDR denials would seem as
authoritative, in most any way that counts,
as one of the court's plurality opinions "on
the merits." In fact, even the court of crim-
inal appeals has gotten caught up in the
process, citing its own PDR refusals (as in
Carroll v. State) and even dissents from
refusals (as in Powell v. State) on the mer-
its of issues.
And on that note, it is best for us to stop.
After all, any more citations and this will
start to sound like a substantive article,
with a resulting loss of readership. At any
rate, it should be clear that the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, in developing and
refining an ostensibly simple PDR process,
has managed to combine all the flexibility
of the U.S. Supreme Court's certiorari
process with all the message-sending abili-
ty of the Texas Supreme Court's writ nota-
tions, while simultaneously preserving and
improving upon all the most confusing
aspects of each. This is no mean accom-
plishment for 10 short years. Just think
what our court of criminal appeals might
do in its next century!
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